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Abstract
Hyperpartisan news on social media presents new challenges for selective exposure theory. These challenges are substan-
tial enough to usher in a new era—a third wave—of selective exposure research. In this essay, we trace the history of the
first two waves of research in order to better understand the current situation. We then assess the implications of recent
developments for selective exposure research.
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1. Introduction
Hyperpartisan news on social media presents new chal-
lenges for selective exposure theory. These challenges
are substantial enough to usher in a new era—a third
wave—of selective exposure research. In this essay, we
trace the history of the first two waves of research in
order to better understand the current situation, pay-
ing particular attention to the societal factors that struc-
ture news exposure. This historical sketch focuses on the
United States because that is where selective exposure
research originated, but the trends we highlight are also
applicable in other national contexts, and it is our asser-
tion that hyperpartisan news affects political communi-
cation worldwide.
2. The First Wave
Selective exposure research can be traced back to the fa-
mous “People’s Choice” study of the 1940 United States
Presidential Election (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet,
1944), later forming the basis of the “minimal effects”
paradigm of the 1950s and 1960s (Klapper, 1960). Amer-
ican society in the 1940s was characterized by “relatively
dense memberships in a group-based society networked
through political parties, churches, unions, and service
organizations” (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008, p. 707). This
dense, community-oriented social organization was ac-
companied by a rich local newspaper ecology:Most cities
had more than one newspaper and many had niche pa-
pers that catered to specific communities. Radio was
immensely popular, but television was not yet on the
scene. Thus, the American mass media system was not
yet fully formed, and most people relied heavily on their
social networks and communities to stay informed about
politics—a “two-step flow” of political communication.
Individuals’ social networks therefore played a large
role in structuring their exposure to news. People read
particular newspapers because that’s what people in
their networks did. For many, selectivity was not nec-
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essarily a product of conscious political motivation, but
rather a byproduct of their social surroundings. Scholars
would later characterize this phenomenon as de facto se-
lective exposure (Sears& Freedman, 1967), whichwas ar-
guably the most prominent conclusion drawn from first
wave of research.
3. The Second Wave
Selective exposure research declined in popularity be-
tween the 1960s and the 2000s, at which point it was
renewed with vigor in response to the rise of par-
tisan media on cable news and the internet. In the
interim, American society had changed dramatically.
Dense, community-oriented social networks had given
way to diffuse, ego-centric networks (Fischer, 1982). The
national mass media system had consolidated and then
diversified with the advent of digital media technologies.
Local media, meanwhile, had begun to decline.
Therefore, the societal factors governing news expo-
sure also had changed. Exposure was now structured
much more by personal interest than it was in the past.
Many people chose not to pay attention to the news at
all (Prior, 2007), and the rest could now choose news
that reflected their political ideologies and/or partisan
identities (Stroud, 2011). While it is true that online
communities also shaped news exposure, membership
in these communities was driven by personal interest
rather than by geography. These developments led to
growing concerns about political polarization (Garrett &
Stroud, 2014), and, thus, the second wave of selective
exposure research emphasized the deleterious effects of
partisanship in the media and the public.
4. The Third Wave?
Socialmedia in general, and hyperpartisan news in partic-
ular, pose new challenges to selective exposure theory,
and we predict that these challenges will usher in a third
wave of research as scholars attempt to meet them. So-
cial media have restructured news exposure in two ways:
by diversifying social connections and by facilitating the
rise of hyperpartisan news.
4.1. Diversification
Social media have changed people’s news use habits,
but they have not created “filter bubbles” of likeminded
content. The filter bubbles idea, which drew from
older fears about “online echo chambers” and “cyber-
Balkanization,” has become a popular narrative since
Pariser’s (2011) influential book and its accompanying
Ted Talk, but empirical evidence tells a different story. In
fact, most research shows that rather than acting as a
homogenizing influence, social media diversify commu-
nication relative to other settings (Barnidge, 2017).
Part of why this occurs is because we are once
again getting our news through our social networks.
Many social media users report that they don’t seek
out news because they believe the news will come to
them (Toff & Nielsen, 2018), and these patterns of be-
havior result in relatively high levels of incidental expo-
sure to news on social media (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).
However, this reliance on social networks for news is
not a return to the 1940s. We are no longer embed-
ded in tight-knit, community-based networks. Rather, so-
cial networks are large, diffused, diverse, and organized
around individuals. Thus, social media promote not infor-
mational selectivity, but rather informational diversity,
because the social networks that drive news exposure
also have diversified.
4.2. Hyperpartisan News
Social media also have facilitated the rise of hyperpar-
tisan news. Hyperpartisan news: (1) has an obviously
one-sided political agenda, which makes no effort to
balance opposing views; (2) pushes anti-system mes-
sages that are critical of both mainstream media and
establishment politics, often relying on misinformation
to do so; and (3) relies heavily on social media as a
platform for dissemination. Thus, hyperpartisan news
can be situated squarely at the intersection of partisan
and alternative news, and considerable overlap exists be-
tween hyperpartisan news and “fake” news (Mourão &
Robertson, 2019).
This conceptual location distinguishes hyperpartisan
news from older forms of partisan news, because hyper-
partisan news is not just partisan, but also alternative. As
non-mainstream media that eschew journalistic norms
and routines, alternative media typically challenge or
subvert mainstream narratives and establishment poli-
tics. Recently, these media have found a larger audience
on social media, which afford news organizations a free
publishing platform and users the ability to share mes-
sages independently of legacy media.
5. Implications for Selective Exposure Research
These two trends—the diversification of news exposure
and the proliferation of hyperpartisan news—present
new challenges to selective exposure research. These in-
clude: (1) two-sided exposure on social media; (2) the
nature of hyperpartisan news effects; and (3) the ineffec-
tiveness of traditional “antidotes” to selective exposure.
First, exposure to hyperpartisan news is generally
two-sided. Because hyperpartisan news is typically pro-
duced for and spread via social media, there also are
increased opportunities for incidental exposure to it.
In fact, our own research suggests that social media
users, particularly strong partisans, are exposed to both
left- and right-leaning hyperpartisan news on social me-
dia (Peacock, Hoewe, Panek, & Willis, 2019). Therefore,
while people still seek out congenial information and
share it on social media, they are exposed to counter-
attitudinal hyperpartisan news through the very same
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channels. Thus, selective exposure research must come
to terms with the fact that the same social media behav-
iors can expose people to hyperpartisan sources on both
sides of the political spectrum.
Second, the nature of hyperpartisan news effects
may differ from the effects of exposure to older forms
of partisan news. Hyperpartisan news is meant to cause
outrage, cue partisan emotions, and get clicks (i.e., make
money). Cyrus Massoumi, who ran a conservative page
called Truth Monitor along with a liberal page called
Truth Examiner, described his content as “always inflam-
matory” and “excluding facts from the other side.” He
says his sites were meant to cater to “the lowest com-
mon denominator”. Hyperpartisan news does just that:
It provides low-quality news with the goal of making
money from people’s—in many cases misguided—anger
and outrage.
What does consuming such content do to news con-
sumers? No doubt it exacerbates political polarization,
particularly affective polarization. But these polarizing
effects are likely just the tip of the iceberg. Hyperpar-
tisan sites commonly traffic in misinformation and con-
spiracy theories (Mourão & Robertson, 2019), a practice
that probably results in pervasive distrust in institutions
and information among its audience. The threat of hyper-
partisan news is therefore less about exacerbating left—
right ideological divides andmore about creating newpo-
litical divides between thosewho support democratic po-
litical systems and thosewhowant to undermine them. It
isn’t just about competing perspectives. It is about blend-
ing truth and untruth to subvert those perspectives al-
together, diverting public conversations away from fact-
based arguments and positions.
A consistent diet of hyperpartisan news likely results
in an audience that is angry, misinformed, highly dis-
trustful of news media and political institutions, and ea-
ger to vote for non-establishment or anti-democratic po-
litical candidates. Therefore, in today’s media environ-
ment, we should perhaps be concernedmore about anti-
democracy effects than we are about political polariza-
tion. Furthermore, because of the global reach of social
media, hyperpartisan news has the potential to under-
mine news media and political democracy not just in the
United States but around the world. Indeed, hyperpar-
tisan news certainly appears to coincide with the rise
of populist parties and candidates in countries includ-
ing Hungary, Brazil, the Philippines, Italy, France, and the
United Kingdom, among others.
Finally, the known “antidotes” to the polarizing ef-
fects of selective exposure may not work the same for
hyperpartisan news. Exposure to counter-dispositional
information has commonly been heralded as a way to
counteract the influence of partisanmedia, reduce polar-
ization, and increase tolerance. When it comes to hyper-
partisan news, though, it is difficult to see how this “anti-
dotal effect” would work. Is it reasonable to believe one
could “balance” the content of conservative Truth Moni-
tor by reading the liberal Truth Examiner? Both sites dis-
seminate the same low-quality, conspiratorial content,
meaning onemight anticipate even fewer reasoned opin-
ions and lower tolerance from a reader who visits both
left- and right-leaning hyperpartisan sites. Thus, expo-
sure to hyperpartisan news may be a different animal
altogether from partisan news on cable television and
more established online sites—and one that is decidedly
more threatening to the foundations of democratic soci-
eties around the world.
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